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Abstract 
 
The ‘Metaphysics of Dasein’ is the name which Heidegger gave to a new philosophical 
project developed immediately after the partial publication of his masterwork Being and 
Time (1927). As Heidegger was later to recall, an ‘overturning’ took place at that moment, 
more precisely right in the middle of the 1929 treatise On the Essence of Ground. Between 
the fundamental-ontological formulation of the question of being and its metaphysical 
rephrasing, Heidegger discovered that a ‘metaphysical freedom’ stood at the root of 
Dasein’s relation to his world and, thus, at the basis of his whole ontological questioning. 
This article will show how the very structure of the 1929 essay clearly illustrates the path 
Heidegger followed between Being and Time and the new philosophical beginning of the 
mid-1930s. It will conclude with a few critical remarks concerning Heidegger’s attempt to 
free his thinking from traditional philosophy and to overcome metaphysics. 
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Introduction 
As soon as Heidegger finished the writing of his masterwork Sein und Zeit, somewhere in the fall 
of 1926, a shift occurred in his use of the term ‘metaphysics’. We have to recall that Sein und Zeit 
was written against ‘metaphysics’. The first line of the book left no doubt: ‘The question [of 
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being] has today been forgotten—although our time considers itself progressive in again 
affirming “metaphysics”’ (Heidegger, 2001a: p. 2/1).ii Heidegger refers here to a ‘resurrection of 
metaphysics’ that gained popularity at the beginning of the 20th century with authors such as 
Georg Simmel, Nicolai Hartmann or Peter Wust (who in 1920 wrote a book called Die 
Auferstehung der Metaphysik). According to Sein und Zeit, this ‘new’ metaphysics wrongly believed it 
was ‘spared the exertion of rekindling the gigantomachia peri tēs ousias’ that ‘sustained the avid 
research of Plato and Aristotle’.iii 
But while writing his book, Heidegger started to contemplate the possibility of something he 
characterized as ‘scientific metaphysics’. During the winter of 1926/27, in his lecture course 
dedicated to the ‘History of Philosophy from Thomas Aquinas to Kant,’ Heidegger was already 
speaking of his phenomenological ontology as a scientific metaphysics and characterized his question 
of being as a metaphysical one. The following years gave Heidegger the chance to develop a new 
philosophical project that was not perfectly identical with that of the fundamental ontology and 
to which he gave the name ‘metaphysics of Dasein’. 
For many years, this metaphysical project could be considered a curiosity of which Heidegger 
spoke only in 1929, in the fourth part of Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik. But with the recent 
publication of the lecture courses held at the end of the 1920s in the Gesamtausgabe, it became 
impossible not to consider that Heidegger was in fact really trying to lay the grounds of a new 
metaphysics—really trying, so to speak, to become a metaphysician. Of course, this did not last. We 
know that in the mid-1930s, Heidegger had already started on a new path that would leave 
metaphysics behind. But between 1926 and 1930, we have to recognize that Heidegger tried to 
give a metaphysical answer to the question of being. And this has to be a surprising discovery if we 
consider that Heidegger is normally viewed as the ‘Grand Inquisitor’ who, once and for all, 
expelled metaphysics from contemporary continental philosophy. But at the end of the 1920s, 
Heidegger never spoke of overcoming, but rather of retrieving the fundamental questions of 
metaphysics. 
This would be a harmless discovery if, during those years, Heidegger had written texts of a 
lesser philosophical value and if we could speak of some ‘mental turmoil’ causing Heidegger to 
think metaphysics was still possible. But according to many scholars, these years could be 
considered the most prolific years of all. Admitting that his question of being was in fact a 
metaphysical question, Heidegger produced some of his most interesting texts.iv 
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Among the texts published at that time, the treatise Vom Wesen des Grundes is probably the one 
which best illustrates the metaphysical path Heidegger followed during these years.v Although 
the text speaks only ‘silently’ of the metaphysical project, I will try to show here that it has to be 
regarded as a turning point between Sein und Zeit and the writings of the mid-1930s, such as the 
Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis). By coming to grips with Heidegger’s metaphysical 
enterprise, we will be able to understand what the 1929 treatise really represented and meant—
something that is rarely achieved in the scholarly literature. My purpose here is first to give an 
overview of Heidegger’s metaphysics of Dasein. Then, I will show how Vom Wesen des Grundes 
accomplishes, from the first to the third sections, the characteristic ‘movements’ of this 
metaphysics of Dasein. The essay opens with a presentation of some fundamental ontological 
considerations on Dasein as being-in-the-world (I. The Problem of Ground). Then it goes through a 
redefining of this same Dasein, describing it as a ‘transcendental being’ (II. Transcendence as the 
Domain of the Question Concerning the Essence of Ground). Finally, Heidegger tries to base this 
transcendence on an original notion of freedom, thought as ‘freedom toward ground’ (III. On the 
Essence of Ground). These three moments correspond perfectly to the path that Heidegger’s 
thought followed between 1926 and 1930. Considering some commentaries the older Heidegger 
made on this treatise, I will show how this metaphysics of Dasein has to be seen as a ‘turning-
point’ between Sein und Zeit and the new beginning of the mid-1930s. To conclude, I shall try to 
weigh the impact that this very concept of freedom might have had on Heidegger’s path, 
especially concerning his relation to the metaphysical tradition. 
 
I The Metaphysics of Dasein (1926-1930) 
After the publication of the first two sections of the uncompleted Sein und Zeit in the Spring of 
1927, Heidegger remained silent for two years. In fact, we have to wait until the spring of 1929 
for a second major publication: Vom Wesen des Grundes.vi Even if one could legitimately expect 
this text to complete the fundamental ontology of 1927, Heidegger preferred to work on a 
problem that was only discreetly mentioned in Sein und Zeit: Dasein’s transcendence.vii In the next 
few years, Heidegger was not so much to try to answer the Hauptwerk’s unresolved questions as 
to develop what he called a ‘metaphysics of Dasein,’ an attempt to give a metaphysical answer to 
the question of being. Pleading for a ‘metaphysical’ thinking whose central topic would be 
transcendence, Heidegger surprisingly rallied for a short period to philosophical paths he would 
soon try to overcome. 
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Under the auspices of metaphysics, Heidegger produced some of his most powerful 
philosophical texts. This leads us to believe that this temporary association between Heidegger’s 
thought and metaphysics was not a simple ‘fall’ back into traditional or transcendental 
schemes—even though some texts, such as the 1946 Letter on ‘Humanism,’ seem to put it this way. 
The publication of Heidegger’s manuscripts allowed the discovery of this unknown phase of his 
Weg (1926-1930), which corresponds to the development of a ‘metaphysics of Dasein’. 
But despite the obvious philosophical value of these texts, it may seem paradoxical to take 
this attempt to lay anew the grounds of metaphysics seriously. From the mid-1930s on, 
Heidegger worked on an ‘overcoming of metaphysics,’ a project that surely overshadowed that 
of a ‘metaphysics of Dasein’. However, one has to remember that in the mid-1920s Heidegger 
was passionately fond of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason,viii and that he interpreted it as the sole 
explicit attempt in all history to investigate metaphysics’ conditions of possibility. In his turn, 
Heidegger wanted to proceed to a recasting of the essence of metaphysics in order to provide it 
with an authentic base. 
As I mentioned earlier, Heidegger first exposed a positive concept of ‘metaphysics’ in the 
winter semester of 1926/27. From this moment on, Heidegger spoke of a ‘scientific metaphysics’ 
and opposed it to a ‘popular concept (vulgärer Begriff) of metaphysics’ (Heidegger, 2006: pp. 7-10). 
Invoking Kant, who is said to have ‘tried to destroy the non-philosophical metaphysics in order 
to achieve a scientific metaphysics,’ Heidegger defines the ‘popular’ metaphysics as dealing 
ontically with God and the world’s ground. On the contrary, the scientific metaphysics does not 
approach ‘being from its ontical origin,’ but moves within the ‘sobriety and coldness of the 
concept’ (Heidegger, 2006: p. 7). The same would be said in the Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie 
in the next semester, in which Heidegger wrote:  
The transcendental science of being has nothing to do with popular metaphysics, which 
deals with some being behind the known beings; rather, the scientific concept of metaphysics is 
identical with the concept of philosophy in general—critically transcendental science of 
being, ontology. (Heidegger, 1975: p. 23/17; my italics)  
From this moment on, the fundamental ontology that Heidegger presented in Sein und Zeit and 
that attempted to deal with being without referring ontically to some hidden being, fell under 
this new concept of scientific metaphysics. 
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Even though the lecture course of 1927 did not say much about a new metaphysical project, 
it was nonetheless the first one to expose the concept of transcendence that would characterize 
Dasein during these metaphysical years. In this lecture course, Heidegger presented a 
‘phenomenology of transcendence’ that would become, through a redefining of transcendence, a 
harsh critique of Husserl’s ‘transcendental phenomenology’ (Heidegger, 1975: pp. 249, 447/175, 
314) as well as a rejection of the Neo-Kantian interpretation of Kant’s concept of transcendental 
knowledge (Heidegger, 1975: p. 425/299). 
This new concept of transcendence—with which the second section of Vom Wesen des Grundes 
deals—seeks to characterize Dasein’s relation with beings in terms of a ‘surpassing’ from beings to 
being, or a ‘going beyond’ beings toward their being. At the beginning of the second section of 
Vom Wesen des Grundes, Heidegger defines transcendence as meaning:  
something that properly pertains to human Dasein, and does so not merely as one kind of 
comportment among other possible kinds that are undertaken from time to time. Rather, 
it belongs to human Dasein as the fundamental constitution of this being, one that occurs prior to 
all comportment. (…) Transcendence (…) is that surpassing that makes possible such a 
thing as existence in general. (Heidegger, 1976: p. 137/107-8)  
Transcendence was to become the ground for all comportments of Dasein, fundamentally 
because Dasein has no relation with beings if it does not transcend beings toward their being. 
This redefining of the essence of Dasein from care (Sorge) to transcendence does not 
constitute per se a refutation of Sein und Zeit’s theses, but still indicates that Dasein’s constitution 
has now to be considered from a surpassing perspective—which the expression meta-physics 
perfectly describes—that the ontological vocabulary probably failed to acknowledge. This would 
appear even clearer with the coining of the expression ‘metontology’ in the summer of 1928 that 
surely indicates, as we will see, some surpassing of the ontological horizon. 
The lecture course of the winter semester 1927/28 dealt with Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason as 
a model for any attempt to lay anew the grounds for metaphysics. This course was the first one 
to ask the fundamental question ‘what is metaphysics?’—and not merely ‘what is philosophy?’—
and ended up clearly associating Sein und Zeit with metaphysical ambitions: ‘Universality of being 
and radicality of time are the two titles which together denote the tasks which a further thinking 
of the possibility of metaphysics calls for’ (Heidegger, 1977: pp. 426-7/289; my italics). The ontological 
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question concerning being and time was now closely linked to the problem of the possibility of 
metaphysics. This metaphysical meditation would in fact constitute Heidegger’s principal 
occupation for the next few years.  
The project of a ‘metaphysics of Dasein’ was first mentioned in the lecture course of summer 
1928 on Leibniz. It was also in this lecture course that Heidegger proposed—conjointly with the 
late Max Scheler—‘to risk again the step into an authentic metaphysics, that is, to develop 
metaphysics from the ground up’ (Heidegger, 1978: p. 165/132). The exchanges Heidegger had 
with Scheler before his sudden death are probably in part responsible for the interest the former 
took in metaphysics. Let us recall that Scheler’s essay Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos, 
published in 1928 just before his death, concluded with the presentation of some ‘contributions 
to a metaphysics of man’ which recalls Heidegger’s project. This 1928 course was contemporary 
to the writing of Vom Wesen des Grundes and even though the treatise does not mention the 
metaphysics of Dasein, it openly considers that ‘a more radical and more universal conception of 
the essence of transcendence, necessarily entails a more originary elaboration of the idea of 
ontology and thus of metaphysics’ (Heidegger, 1976: p. 140/109-10; my italics).  
The lecture course of 1928 insisted on something that stands at the basis of transcendence: 
freedom, a concept that was fully developed in the treatise Vom Wesen des Grundes. In both texts 
Heidegger develops an ontological concept of freedom that increasingly occupied him until the 
lecture course of summer 1930, entitled Vom Wesen der Freiheit, and in the 1930 conference Vom 
Wesen der Wahrheit, in which Heidegger asserted something as surprising as ‘the essence of truth (…) 
is freedom’ (Heidegger, 1976: p. 186/142). 
The year of 1929 was to be Heidegger’s most openly metaphysical year. For that matter, his 
lecture course Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik—‘Meine erste wirkliche Metaphysikvorlesung!’ 
(Letter to Julius Stenzel on November 23rd, 1929; see Heidegger and Stenzel, 2000: p. 7)—and 
his well-known conference Was ist Metaphysik?—in which Heidegger affirms that metaphysics is 
the ‘fundamental occurrence in our Dasein’ (Heidegger, 1976: p. 122/96)—are both important 
texts. But for the idea of a metaphysics of Dasein, the lecture course of the summer semester 
1929 on German idealism is probably more essential, as Heidegger then contrasted his own finite 
metaphysics with Hegel’s absolute metaphysics. 
The lecture course of summer 1930 on human freedom concluded Heidegger’s metaphysical 
project. Having dealt with the metaphysical problem of freedom, Heidegger attempted a rare 
  7 
incursion into Kantian practical philosophy. Criticizing Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, this 
course introduced a metaphysical understanding of freedom that contrasted with Kant’s concept. 
According to Heidegger, this concept refers to spontaneity, and is thus grounded in the mere 
ontical notion of causality. 
This lecture course was the last one to use the expression ‘metaphysics of Dasein’ as well as 
the last one to consider metaphysics in its possibility. But the last exhaustive presentation of this 
metaphysics was certainly the conference of March 1930, given in Amsterdam, entitled Hegel und 
das Problem der Metaphysik—to be published in Volume 80 of the Gesamtausgabe.ix In this 
interesting text, Heidegger tries to justify his retrieval of the metaphysical undertaking beyond its 
achievement with Hegel’s absolute metaphysics and he introduces the important distinction 
between the metaphysical ‘Leitfrage’ and ‘Grundfrage’—the ‘leading question’ and the ‘fundamental 
question’. For the last time, Heidegger speaks of the possibility of metaphysics and not yet of its 
overcoming. However, if Hegel accomplished metaphysics by exhausting all the possibilities of 
the question concerning ‘beings as such and as a whole’ (the Leitfrage), he nonetheless missed the 
question concerning the condition of possibility of the understanding of being—that of the 
relationship between being and time (the Grundfrage).  
As we will now see, this interpretation of the relation between traditional metaphysics and the 
metaphysical question concerning being and time vanished during the next lecture course, 
dedicated to Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes. But what is of foremost importance for us is to get 
a grasp of the progression Heidegger’s thought went through during these years: from the redefining 
of care and being-in-the-world in terms of transcendence to the understanding of transcendence in terms of freedom. 
What precisely happened between the two interpretations of Hegel’s metaphysics—that of 
March 1930 and that of the winter semester 1930/31—such that the metaphysical project came 
to an end? 
The lecture course that followed the end of this metaphysical interlude has to be considered a 
breaking point in many ways. First of all, we have to remember that in this lecture course 
Heidegger openly abandoned phenomenology to Husserl. Even though he stopped using the 
phenomenological vocabulary for a while, the rupture with Husserl was now complete. As 
Heidegger said, ‘we would do better in the future to give the name of phenomenology only to 
that which Husserl himself has created and continues to produce’ (Heidegger, 1980: p. 40/29). 
Heidegger also abandoned the use of ontological vocabulary to characterize his thinking and tried 
to reinterpret it in terms of an ‘ontochrony,’ in which, as he writes, ‘chronos stands in the place of 
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logos’ (Heidegger, 1980: p. 144/100; see also Heidegger, 1999: 95). This ontochronical undertaking 
did not prosper, but surely indicates that Heidegger was already seeking something new. 
We also have to take into account the coining in this lecture course of the expression ‘onto-
theology,’ a term not to be confused with the one appearing in Kant or in Schopenhauer. From 
this lecture course on, metaphysics would be thought of as achieved once and for all in Hegel, 
with no possibility of retrieval. And this achievement lets us finally see the structure it had had all 
along: the onto-theological structure that, from Aristotle’s prōte philosophia to Hegel’s 
identification of ontology with a ‘theo-logic’ (Theo-Logik) (Heidegger, 1997: p. 32; 2001b: p. 70), 
prevented metaphysics from interrogating being in relation with time. Metaphysics suddenly 
appeared as the impossibility of philosophy’s Grundfrage. The concept of metaphysics would no 
longer be identical with the concept of philosophy in general. And in the next lecture course on 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics, the vocabulary of the overcoming or the surpassing (überholen) of 
metaphysics would then substitute that of the retrieval (wiederholen) (Heidegger, 1981: pp. 81-
2/68-9). In the introductory part of this course, Heidegger ironically referred to his past attempt, 
saying: ‘Do we really know what this thing is that we so commonly call “metaphysics”? We do 
not. Nowadays the word bewitches us like a magical incantation, with its suggestion of 
profundity and its promise of salvation’ (Heidegger, 1981: p. 3/1). 
If this coining of the onto-theological vocabulary is so important, it is because Heidegger, in 
his metaphysical period, did not use metaphysical vocabulary in a merely rhetorical fashion, but 
really tried to give a specific solution to the problematical unity of metaphysics as it first 
explicitly appeared in Aristotle’s concept of prōte philosophia. Although the concept of ‘onto-
theology’ only appeared at the beginning of the 1930s, the ‘idea’ behind it was already present in 
the mid-1920s.x Thus, when Heidegger planned a retrieval of metaphysical questioning, he was 
already perfectly aware of this dual structure. 
 
II The onto-theological constitution of the metaphysics of Dasein 
In fact, Heidegger always thought of his metaphysics of Dasein as the retrieval (Wiederholung) of 
an unsolved problem in Aristotle: that of the unity of the ontological and theological 
questionings. But Heidegger did not try to solve first philosophy’s ‘remarkable doubling’ or even 
to reconcile it into a unity. Heidegger’s task was rather to ‘illuminate the grounds for the 
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apparent disunity and the manner in which both determinations belong together as the leading 
problem of a “first philosophy” of beings’ (Heidegger, 1998: p. 8/5). This obscure relationship 
between the question of beings (to on) and the question of the divine (to theion)—unquestioned 
since the death of Aristotle (Heidegger, 1983: pp. 51-3/32-5; 1997: p. 34)—has to be 
interrogated as to its unity and its origin. 
The metaphysics of Dasein tried to investigate more radically the traditional metaphysical 
problems. Besides the ontological problems, Heidegger opened a realm of questioning where 
beings are no longer questioned in their being or their beingness, but rather as a whole (im 
Ganzen). In some texts, Heidegger explicitly presented his metaphysics of Dasein following the 
onto-theological structure. These texts show that Heidegger did not then conceive the onto-
theological problem as a faulty path for philosophical questioning, but as a possible access to 
philosophy’s basic questions. 
The first two texts that I will discuss are taken from the Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im 
Ausgang von Leibniz, in which Heidegger traces explicit parallels between the Aristotelian division 
of Metaphysics (prōte philosophia/theologike episteme) and divisions that exist inside his own thought. 
The first text, often commented on, is taken from the famous appendix inserted in the middle of 
the second part and entitled ‘Describing the Idea and Function of a Fundamental Ontology’ 
(Heidegger, 1978: pp. 196-202/154-9). The initial plan of the systematic part of Sein und Zeit’s 
fundamental ontology consisted of two essential sections: an ‘interpretation of Dasein in terms 
of temporality’ and an ‘explication of time as the transcendental horizon of the question of 
being’ (Heidegger, 2001a: p. 41/37). In the summer semester 1928, Heidegger added a third 
section to this fundamental ontology. As he then wrote, this third section should not be 
understood as a step further, but as a ‘turning-around’ (Kehre) of this analysis, an ‘overturning’ 
(Umschlag) that enables the fully developed fundamental ontology to return to its ontical point of 
departure: ‘The temporal analysis is at the same time the turning-around, where ontology itself 
expressly runs back into the metaphysical ontic (in die metaphysische Ontik) in which it implicitly 
always remains’ (Heidegger, 1978: p. 201/158). Heidegger simply calls this ontical horizon of the 
ontological investigation ‘metontology’—what comes after (meta) ontology.xi 
I will not try to give an interpretation of this metontology here.xii My aim is simply to 
highlight the fact that Heidegger traces a parallel between this new structure of fundamental 
ontology—or of the metaphysics of Dasein—and that of Aristotle’s metaphysics:  
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In their unity, fundamental ontology and metontology constitute the concept of 
metaphysics. But herein is expressed the transformation of the one basic problem of 
philosophy itself, the one touched upon above in the introduction under the dual 
concept of philosophy as prōte philosophia and theologia. (Heidegger, 1978: p. 202/158) 
Heidegger thus characterized this ‘modified version’ of fundamental ontology as a new answer to 
the ‘basic problem of philosophy’ that sustained the avid metaphysical research of Aristotle. 
Even though the nature of this metontology is problematical, we have to recognize that 
Heidegger indicated here that, following the example of Aristotle, his own metaphysics presents a 
twofold structure: fundamental ontology and metontology. 
But this is not the only passage in this lecture course to recognize such a link between the 
traditional division of metaphysics and the metaphysics of Dasein. Analyzing the definition of 
philosophy that Aristotle gives in his Metaphysics (books 4 and 5), Heidegger established some 
parallel with his own thought in the introduction, referring to what was developed in Sein und 
Zeit:  
Let us keep in mind that philosophy, as first philosophy, has a twofold character: 
knowledge of being [sc. ontology] and knowledge of the overwhelming [sc. theology]. 
(This twofold character corresponds to the twofold (dem Zweifachen) in Being and Time of 
existence and thrownness). (Heidegger, 1978: p. 13/11) 
Heidegger recognized once more that this twofold character of Aristotle’s Metaphysics found a 
certain response in Sein und Zeit. But what did this mentioned ‘twofold’ mean in Sein und Zeit, and 
how could it correspond to the Aristotelian division of metaphysics? 
Existence (Existenz) and thrownness (Geworfenheit) are presented in Sein und Zeit as two of the 
three basic characters of Dasein’s being, of care (Sorge). According to §§ 41 and 58, care 
encompasses the unity of three ontological determinations: ‘facticity (thrownness), existence 
(project) and falling prey (Verfallen)’ (Heidegger, 2001a: p. 284/262). This twofold of existence 
and thrownness of which the passage speaks is a subject that Heidegger often mentioned with 
this unique formula: ‘thrown project’ (Heidegger, 2001a: p. 285/263; 1998: p. 235/165). 
According to this characterization, Dasein would stand between the power to project the 
possibilities of a world (project) and a complete helplessness as to the withdrawal of some of 
these possibilities (thrownness). Only a complete analysis of this notion would give us an 
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understanding of the parallel Heidegger traces with the Aristotelian division of metaphysics. 
However, what matters here is to recognize the existence of such parallels. 
We should also mention Heidegger’s characterization of the ‘authentic concept of 
metaphysics,’ in the winter semester 1928/29. In this Einleitung in die Philosophie, Heidegger 
described the tasks of his philosophical investigations not with the twofold of fundamental 
ontology and metontology, but with a dichotomy between the problem of being and the 
problem of the world. Once again, Heidegger seems to acknowledge the limits of his ontological 
approach and tries to give a more complete idea of philosophy. Even though Heidegger did not 
mention Aristotle’s Metaphysics, the many interpretations he then gave of Aristotelian theology in 
terms of a worldly or ‘pagan’ problematic suggest that this problem of the world has to be 
understood as the problem of the theion, the problem of beings as a whole.xiii 
In the winter semester 1928/29, the problem of the world was presented as a complementary 
problem to that of being, in such a way that their unity is then said to form philosophy’s 
complete problematic: ‘The problem of the world is primordially united with the problem of 
being; in their unity, the problem of being and the problem of the world first determine the unity 
of the authentic concept of metaphysics’ (Heidegger, 1996: pp. 323-4). But the connection 
between both problems was outlined without being fully developed: ‘The problem of being—in 
its originality—unfolds necessarily in what we call the problem of the world’ (Heidegger, 1996: p. 
391). And further:  
On his side, the problem of the world, once unfolded, does not allow itself to be isolated, 
but bursts again and bounces on the construction of the problem of being. The problem 
of being unfolds as the problem of the world, the problem of the world sinks into the 
problem of being—this means: both problems form philosophy’s one problematic. 
(Heidegger, 1996: p. 394) 
The onto-theological structure of the metaphysics of Dasein was thus presented in various 
ways at the end of the 1920s. But as already mentioned, the concept of ‘onto-theology’ only 
appeared in the winter semester 1930/31 on Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes, and with a negative 
connotation. From then on, this metaphysical structure would represent a characteristic peculiar 
to this traditional interrogation on beings (as such and as a whole) which the fundamental 
philosophical question concerning being has to overcome. The emergence of this distinction 
between philosophy’s Leitfrage and Grundfrage coincides with the abandonment of this attempt to 
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explicitly retrieve Aristotle’s dual conception of philosophy. When Heidegger identified the 
onto-theological structure with the incapacity of metaphysics to ask correctly the question of 
being, it should be seen as a direct critique of the metaphysical attempt that he had made in the 
preceding years—an attempt that was onto-theological in a ‘positive’ way.  
The Brief über den ‘Humanismus’ of November 1946 would later confirm that the achievement 
of Sein und Zeit ‘did not succeed with the help of the language of metaphysics’ (Heidegger, 1976: 
p. 328/250). Even clearer is the letter Heidegger wrote to Max Müller in November 1947, in 
which he said that the very title Sein und Zeit was a catastrophe, as was the whole effort of that 
time, as it never succeeded in overcoming ‘the onto-theological basis of metaphysics’ (Heidegger, 
2003: p. 15). If, for a few years, Heidegger took up the onto-theological challenge—which was 
then intended to try to solve, in a ‘retrieval manner,’ the problematic unity of metaphysics—, he 
later considered it an attempt fully embedded in that ‘incurable’ metaphysical structure, and tried 
to overcome it. The mere idea of ‘authentic metaphysics’ is thus contradictory. Of course, this 
does not mean that Heidegger would ever purely ‘reject’ the ontological or metaphysical attempts 
he made in the 1920s. It was, it might be said, a necessary step towards a transition (Übergang) to 
a new beginning.  
 
III      Vom Wesen des Grundes  and the achievement of the metaphysics of Dasein 
It is thus possible to describe Heidegger’s metaphysics of Dasein in terms of three different 
moments: the fundamental ontological moment, which corresponds to the years 1926 and 1927; 
the transcendental moment, which first emerged in the summer of 1927 and disappeared after 
the summer of 1929; and, finally, the moment of freedom, which appeared in 1928 and became 
the ‘ground of ground’ (Grund des Grundes) until the end of the metaphysical enterprise. 
The project of a metaphysics of Dasein thus reached its peak with the exposition of a 
metaphysical concept of freedom that Heidegger considered the origin and condition of 
possibility of all ontical freedom (like, for example, the Kantian concept of spontaneity), as well 
as all possible relation with beings, whether it be practical, theoretical or aesthetic. But why does 
the project end with these observations on freedom? Is this new concept the cause of the 
‘abandonment’ of this metaphysical project, or should we consider it its achievement, its success? 
Should we speak here, as it is often the case with Sein und Zeit’s fundamental ontology, of the 
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‘failure’ of the metaphysics of Dasein? In other words, did this project promise more than it 
really delivered? 
In the case of Sein und Zeit, it was quite simple to establish not only from a philosophical point 
of view, but also at a purely material level, that the fundamental ontology did not give the 
‘expected results’. The incompletion of the book is a testimony to the fact that the solution to 
the problem initially posed could not be given. But in the case of the project of the metaphysics 
of Dasein, we have no textual or material reasons to consider it a failure. Nonetheless, we have 
to wonder why the project came to an end. 
We can at the outset note that the critique the older Heidegger made of the fundamental 
ontology does not seem to spare the metaphysics of Dasein. Insofar as both the fundamental 
ontology and the metaphysics of Dasein try to think of being by bringing to light the essence of 
Dasein, both projects have to be considered, from the perspective of the Brief über den 
‘Humanismus,’ as still not achieving the abandonment of subjectivity (Heidegger, 1976: p. 
328/250). Yet, a commentary taken from the Beiträge zur Philosophie from the years 1936-38 
speaks precisely of the treatise Vom Wesen des Grundes not as a mere continuation of the 
fundamental ontology, but as a new attempt to remedy the ‘crisis’ that the question of being was 
going through after the partial publication of Sein und Zeit:  
Thus at the deciding juncture it was necessary to overcome the crisis of the question of 
being (…), and above all to avoid an objectification of beyng (eine Vergegenständlichung des 
Seyns)—on the one hand by holding back the ‘temporal’ interpretation of beyng and at the 
same time by attempting besides (unabhängig davon) to make the truth of beyng ‘visible’ 
(freedom toward ground in Vom Wesen des Grundes, and yet in the first part of this treatise 
the ontic-ontological schema is still thoroughly maintained). (Heidegger, 1989: p. 
451/317) 
Heidegger did not just hold back the conclusion of the fundamental ontology; he also tried, as 
he says, to ‘overcome the crisis of the question of being’ by means of a presentation of the 
concept of ‘freedom toward ground’ (Freiheit zum Grunde)xiv, which was explained in the third part 
of Vom Wesen des Grundes. According to what is said in this passage, these developments 
constituted a new way of approaching the problem of being, one independent (unabhängig) of the 
temporal interpretation of being. Thus, Heidegger recognized in the Beiträge that the treatise of 
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1929 was already an attempt to avoid the objectification process deployed in Sein und Zeit, even 
though the first section was still embedded in the 1927 ‘ontic-ontological schema’.  
As we have seen earlier, in the first section of the treatise Heidegger exposes the most central 
theses of Sein und Zeit, while discussing Leibniz’s concept of ratio. After presenting the 
‘transcendence of Dasein’ in the second part, the treatise deals, in its third and last part, with the 
concept of ‘freedom toward ground’ that the Beiträge identified with an attempt to overcome the 
crisis of the question of being. Thus, it is as though the 1929 essay exemplified, from its first to 
its third part, the transition, der Übergang, that leads from the fundamental ontology to a new 
approach to the question of being, one that distances itself from the objectification of being that 
was part of the project elaborated in Sein und Zeit.xv  
The treatise Vom Wesen des Grundes thus describes the whole journey of what Heidegger called 
the metaphysics of Dasein, from being-in-the-world to transcendence to freedom. Some of the 
marginal notes we find in Heidegger’s first edition of the treatise confirm that something 
happened between the first and the third part of the essay. On the threshold of the first part, 
Heidegger notes: ‘The approach in terms of the truth of beyng (Seyn) is undertaken here [that is: 
in the first part] still entirely within the framework of traditional metaphysics’. And Heidegger 
adds: ‘Here one path toward overcoming “ontology” as such is broached (cf. Part III)’ 
(Heidegger, 1976: p. 126, Anm. a/100, note a). According to this, the 1929 essay would do no 
more than retrieve a traditional and metaphysical approach to doing philosophy. But it would 
nonetheless open, in its third part, a path toward the overcoming of this same metaphysics.  
A note added to the first page of the third part in the same edition follows the same idea:  
In [the] III[rd part], an approach to the destructuring (Destruktion) of [the] I[st part], that is, 
of the ontological difference, [of the] ontic-ontological truth. In [the] III[rd part], the step 
into a realm that compels the demolition (Zerstörung) of what has gone before and makes 
a complete overturning (Umkippung) necessary’. (Heidegger, 1976: p. 163, Anm. a/125 
note a)  
Heidegger recognizes here that the third part constitutes the overcoming of the first one; that is 
to say that the exposition of freedom toward ground in the third part undertakes the destructuring of the basic 
notions of the fundamental ontology exposed in the first part and that this destructuring makes a complete 
overturning necessary. As such, the treatise Vom Wesen des Grundes has one foot in the fundamental 
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ontology and another one in the overcoming of this same fundamental ontology—a process that 
we surely associate with what Heidegger called the Kehre, the turning. Between a ‘classical’ 
development of the question of being in the first part—centered on the preontological 
understanding of being, on the conceptualization of being, on the ontological truth and on the 
ontological difference—and this new unfolding, in the third part, of a concept of freedom 
defined as freedom toward ground, an overturning took place. 
All these observations are not contemporary with the writing of Vom Wesen des Grundes. It is 
an older Heidegger that, retrospectively, discovers that the germ of the overcoming of the 
fundamental ontology was already to be found in this important treatise of 1929. In the last 
moments of the metaphysics of Dasein, the concept of freedom gained an increasing 
importance, as in the 1930 text Vom Wesen der Wahrheit. Why then should we speak of the 
‘failure’ of the metaphysics of Dasein? In what way was the metaphysics of Dasein an 
unsuccessful attempt? According to the commentaries Heidegger made, starting from the mid-
1930s, it seems that the metaphysics of Dasein would rather present itself as a path toward the 
overcoming of the ‘crisis of the question of being’ and thus permit the transition from Sein und 
Zeit towards new attempts to deal with the problem of being. The ‘step’ into metaphysics would 
accomplish what the Beiträge call the ‘transition’ (der Übergang), the conversion of fundamental 
ontology into the thinking that unfolds after the turning and aims toward a new beginning. If 
this were correct, the metaphysics of Dasein would then be nothing other than the turning itself.  
If we can easily speak of Sein und Zeit as a failure because the promised ‘concrete answer to 
the question of the meaning of being’ (Heidegger, 2001a: p. 19/17) was never given, it seems 
impossible to do so for the metaphysics of Dasein. As such, it didn’t make any promises apart 
from these two: ‘to develop metaphysics from the ground up’ (Heidegger, 1978: 165/132) and 
‘to present a new laying of its grounds’ (Heidegger, 1998: p. 1/1). As we have just seen, this 
developing of metaphysics allowed a transition toward something else and opened the way to a 
reconsideration of the fundamental ontology. It accomplished its task by discovering an 
ontological or metaphysical concept of freedom that grounds the preontological understanding 
of being on which Sein und Zeit established itself. 
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IV Freedom and the overcoming of metaphysics 
In the post-Kehre perspective of the Beiträge, we could thus argue that by accomplishing the 
demolition (Zerstörung) of the fundamental ontology—that is, by accomplishing the turning—, the 
metaphysics of Dasein should not be considered a failure. The ‘more original elaboration of the 
idea of metaphysics’ of which Vom Wesen des Grundes speaks thus represents, in this later 
perspective, the first draft of an overcoming of metaphysics. We could then speak of the metaphysics 
of Dasein as an accomplishment, and not as a failure. 
As we saw at the end of the first section, Heidegger began to mention this surpassing 
(Überholung) of metaphysics as early as in the summer semester 1932. Heidegger then indirectly 
recognized he had been somewhat ‘bewitched’ by the idea of a new metaphysics. Should we 
conclude from this that the development of the concept of freedom toward ground not only 
accomplished the demolition of the fundamental ontology, but also set Heidegger free from his 
metaphysical path of thinking? It looks as though the concept of freedom toward ground gives 
us the answer to why Heidegger abandoned metaphysics.  
As Jean-Luc Nancy argued in his 1988 book L’expérience de la pensée, we can identify various 
steps in Heidegger’s reflections on freedom (Nancy, 1988: pp. 54-5/35-6). Even if Sein und Zeit 
could legitimately be characterized as a philosophy of freedom,xvi the concept as such only 
became a basic notion during the years of the metaphysics of Dasein, in the essay Vom Wesen des 
Grundes, in the text Vom Wesen der Wahrheit and in the summer semester 1930 lecture course Vom 
Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit. At the end of the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s, Heidegger 
openly tried to ground his whole metaphysical endeavour on the concept of freedom. We have 
already seen fundamental ontology’s basic concepts substituted by that of freedom in Vom Wesen 
des Grundes, but we could also mention that a year later, in Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, Heidegger 
showed that the very concept of truth depends, according to its essence, on the concept of 
freedom. And in his long commentary on Kant’s ethics in the summer of 1930, Heidegger took 
one last step and wrote that “The question concerning the essence of human freedom is the fundamental 
question of philosophy, in which is rooted even the question of being.” (Heidegger, 1982: 300/203). 
Once he had abandoned his project of a metaphysics of Dasein, Heidegger nonetheless 
continued his investigations into freedom, turning his attention toward a new interlocutor. In the 
mid-1930s, Schelling’s 1809 treatise Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit replaced Kant’s 1785 
Grundlegung zur Metaphysik des Sittens.xvii According to Nancy, we have to understand this reading 
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of Schelling as still governed by the methodological principles of retrieval or repetition 
(Wiederholung) (Nancy 1988: 58/39). In this lecture course, the dialogue with Schelling—as was 
the case with Plato and Aristotle in Sein und Zeit or with Kant in the Kantbuch—still constituted an 
attempt to ask anew the traditional philosophical questions from a ‘destructuring’ perspective, 
that is, a reading that frees untapped possibilities hidden in the traditional texts with the aim of 
transforming the basic philosophical questions.xviii 
If the dialogue with Schelling in 1936 can still be interpreted as some sort of a destructuring 
attempt, such is not the case with the erneute Auslegung of Schelling’s treatise in the years 1941-43. 
In the second reading, the gesture of retrieval was replaced by the ‘gesture of separation’ (Nancy, 
1988: p. 59/39). The Auseinandersetzung with tradition is still thought of as an attempt to free 
oneself from tradition, but a certain resolution to free tradition from our traditional 
interpretations has been lost. We can talk about two ways of freeing oneself from tradition in 
Heidegger’s oeuvre. With the project of a ‘phenomenological destructuring’ of the history of 
philosophy, Heidegger always envisaged his relationship with the past as an attempt to free both 
the historical thinkers and ourselves from mere tradition (Tradition, Weitergabe). The task was to 
open an access to forgotten questions and to transform them in such a way that they would 
become problematic once again. As an example, Sein und Zeit is presented as a reawakening of an 
understanding for the meaning of the question of being—a question that Plato and Aristotle 
tried to solve and that tradition thereafter eclipsed. Destructuring is thus a way to make us free 
from a superficial and traditional understanding of the past, a way that also makes us free for a 
new formulation of philosophy’s fundamental problems.xix  
In the phenomenological years, Heidegger never read historical writings with the aim of 
‘getting over’ or ‘surmounting’ (überwinden) philosophy and leaving it on its own. As opposed to 
the ‘destructuring path,’ the ‘overcoming path’ can be described as an attempt to free thinking 
from traditional philosophy. The whole Western philosophical tradition is then thought of as the 
metaphysics, which then means as a ‘homogeneous’ attempt to determine being as phusis. The 
prolific dialogue with the history of philosophy that was the hallmark of Heidegger’s texts in the 
1920s led the way to an attempt to surmount traditional thinking towards a new beginning that 
would be completely free from metaphysics. From this moment on, Heidegger did not try to 
radicalize what had already been done, but to overcome it. We can illustrate this fundamental 
difference by referring to what Heidegger says about the relation between the ‘leading question’ 
and the ‘fundamental question’ mentioned earlier. At the end of the 1920s, Heidegger tried to 
show how it is possible to ask the leading question so as to convert it into the fundamental 
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question—an elaboration thought of as a radicalization, a ‘working-through’ (Ausarbeitung) or a 
progression that can be described with a series of questions:  
The following series of question arose: ti to on, what are beings? What are beings as such? 
What are beings in respect to their being? What is being? What is being understood as? 
We have, so to speak, dug more and more into the content of the leading question, and 
thereby dug out more primordial questions. (Heidegger 1982: 111/78) 
But this slow development of the fundamental question that would take its point of departure 
in the traditional way of questioning beings was replaced, in the Beiträge, by the idea of a ‘leap’ 
(Sprung) that disclosed the necessity of a new beginning: 
Going from the leading question to the fundamental question, there is never an 
immediate, equi-directional and continual process that once again applies the leading 
question (to be-ing); rather, there is only a leap, i.e., the necessity of an other beginning. 
(Heidegger 1989: 76/53; slightly modified translation) 
Between the summer semester 1930 lecture course on human freedom and the writing of the 
Beiträge between 1936 and 1938, Heidegger augmented the distance that separated traditional 
metaphysics and his own attempt to question being. This coincided with the abandonment of 
any consideration of ‘human freedom’ at the end of the 1930s, in the name of what Nancy calls 
the ‘freedom of being’ (Nancy, 1988: p. 59/40). The metaphysical freedom (freedom toward 
ground) and its corresponding metaphysics of freedom that Heidegger developed at the end of 
the 1920s vanished with this necessity of a new beginning. Freedom no longer represented the 
possibility of freeing oneself from mere tradition and could only be understood as the mark of 
subjectivity. This distance taken from freedom can be regarded, as Nancy argues, as the final 
separation from metaphysical thinking. In fact, the 1936 lecture course on Schelling was 
probably the last occurrence of a positive notion of metaphysics in Heidegger’s works 
(Heidegger, 1971: p. 79)xx. The second lecture courses on Schelling left no doubt as to the 
necessity of abandoning metaphysics and freedom altogether:  
Freedom: metaphysically as the name for the capacity to begin something by itself 
(spontaneity, cause). As soon as it moves metaphysically into the centre (into true 
metaphysics) it intrinsically unifies the determination of cause and selfhood . . . that is, of 
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subjectivity. In the perspective of a more initial thought, a thought of the history of being, 
freedom forfeited its role. (Heidegger, 1971: p. 330) 
Freedom set Heidegger free from his fundamental-ontological path and the ‘crisis of the 
question of being’ that this metaphysical framework had to bring about. For some years, 
Heidegger still considered human freedom from a positively metaphysical perspective. But the 
attempt to free his thinking from subjectivity finally forced him to free it from any reference to 
freedom, understood as the modern concepts of autonomy and self-regulation.  
The overcoming of metaphysics—and of freedom, as we have seen—would have major 
consequences on Heidegger’s relation to the history of philosophy. Leaving behind Western 
philosophy as constituting ‘only’ the first beginning, Heidegger also abandoned one of his most 
inventive and fertile projects: that of phenomenological destructuring. Even if we can argue that 
destructuring was never fully abandoned by Heidegger, the basic concept of retrieval that is 
essentially linked to it proved incompatible with the idea of a new beginning. Plato, Aristotle, 
Kant or Schelling are no longer regarded as ‘allies’ in his search for a ‘concrete answer to the 
question of the meaning of being,’ but only as halts on the route of a Seynsgeschichte. The dialogue 
with them still exists, but the very project of finding new questions hidden behind 
‘concealments’ produced by tradition has lost its meaning. The peculiar yet productive relation 
that Heidegger’s thought had with history in the 1920s has been lost on the way. If Heidegger’s 
path can be followed with great interest up to the overcoming of metaphysics and this freeing 
from freedom, the loss of methodological tools such as destructuring and retrieval may 
nevertheless seem too high a price to pay. These tools represent core concepts for what we call, 
for want of anything better, ‘continental’ philosophy and have inspired a whole generation of 
philosophers.xxi The retrieval of philosophical questions is, in the end, the condition of possibility 
of any positive and productive dialogue with the philosophical tradition. And if we are to debate 
with our contemporaries on shared philosophical questions, it might also be the basic nature of 
any philosophical dialogue. 
Archives Husserl, Paris 
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Notes 
 
                                                
i. Support for this research was provided by […]. 
ii. Our citations of Heidegger’s texts first list the pagination of the German edition followed by the pagination 
of the English translation, should one be available.  
iii. Concerning the absence of the metaphysical terminology in Sein und Zeit, see Greisch, 1993: pp. 177-8, 
196. In this study, the author argues that Heidegger’s reluctance to use a metaphysical vocabulary up to 
Sein und Zeit not only has to do with the popular philosophers who declared the ‘resurrection of 
metaphysics,’ but also with the still vivid repercussions of Husserl’s 1911 essay Philosophie als strenge 
Wissenschaft. For his part, Jeffrey Andrew Barash considers that the preference Heidegger manifests for 
the ontological––rather than metaphysical–– vocabulary represents a break with the theological motifs of 
his first lecture courses in Freiburg. The word ‘metaphysics’ had then a theological connotation that 
Heidegger tried to avoid (Barash, 2003: pp. 157-8). On the virtual absence of a metaphysical vocabulary 
prior to the publication of Sein und Zeit, see Grondin, 2003: pp. 42-6. 
iv. Cf. Grondin, 2003: p. 57. 
v. The writing of this treatise was finished on October 17th 1928, as Heidegger wrote to Elisabeth Blochmann 
(Heidegger and Blochmann, 1989: p. 27). The text was presented in the Festschrift for Husserl’s 70th 
birthday on April 8th 1929. It was published on May 14th 1929 in the Ergänzungsband zum Jahrbuch für 
Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung (Halle an der Saale: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1929, pp. 71-
110; reprint: Bad Feilnbach: Schmidt Periodicals Gmbh, 1989), simultaneously with the short address that 
Heidegger read on that occasion (“Edmund Husserl zum siebzigsten Geburtstag”. Originally published in 
  24 
                                                                                                                                                  
Akademische Mitteilungen. Organ für die gesamten Interressen der Studentenschaft von der Albert-
Ludwigs-Universität in Freiburg/Br., 4th series, 9th Semester, N°14, May 14th 1929, pp. 46-7; now in 
Heidegger, 2000: pp. 56-60; trans: Sheehan, T., in Husserl, 1997: pp. 475-7). Regarding this matter, cf. 
Sheehan, 1997: p. 28. There are two English translations of this text: The Essence of Reason (trans: Malick 
T., Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969) and On the Essence of Ground (trans: McNeill W., in 
Pathmarks. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
vi. To be exact, in 1928 Heidegger published a book review of Ernst Cassirer’s 1925 Philosophie der 
symbolischen Formen. 2. Teil: das mythische Denken (Deutsche Litteraturzeitung, 21. Heft; now in 
Heidegger 1998), as well as the Editor’s preface to Husserl’s Phänomenologie des inneren 
Zeitbewusstseins (Husserliana, vol. X). 
vii. In the § 69c of Sein und Zeit dedicated to the ‘transcendence of the world,’ Heidegger asks the following 
question: ‘what makes it ontologically possible for beings to be encountered within the world and 
objectified as encountered beings?’ (Heidegger, 2001: p. 366/335). The answer Heidegger then gives can 
be seen as an anticipation of the developments of the metaphysics of Dasein: ‘If the thematization of what 
is objectively present (des Vorhandenen)––the scientific project of nature––is to become possible, Da-sein 
must transcend the beings thematized. Transcendence does not consist in objectivation, but is rather 
presupposed by it. But if the thematization of innerworldly beings objectively present is a change-over 
(Umschlag) from taking care which circumspectly discovers, then a transcendence of Da-sein must already 
underlie “practical” being together with things at hand (beim Zuhandenen)’ (Heidegger, 2001: pp. 363-
4/332). But Heidegger does not explicitly describe Dasein as a transcendental being before the 
Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (summer semester 1927) where it is closely linked to the problem of 
the ontological difference (Heidegger, 1975: § 20e). Transcendence would be understood as Dasein’s basic 
constitution up to the Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik (winter semester 1929/30) where it suddenly 
disappeared (one exception: Heidegger, 1983: p. 447/308). On Dasein’s transcendence, see my […]. 
viii. In two letters to Jaspers (December 10th, 1925 and December 26th, 1926), Heidegger spoke of the ‘love’ 
he then felt for Kant (Heidegger and Jaspers, 1990: pp. 57, 71/61, 73). 
ix. It is nonetheless available in a German-French edition in France-Lanord & Midal 2001,  
pp. 16-62. 
x. Concerning the emergence of the concept of ‘onto-theology,’ see my […]. 
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xi. The expression ‘metontology’ already appeared in the summer semester 1926: “The question of being 
transcends itself. The ontological problem goes into reverse! Metontological; theologikè; beings as a 
whole” (Heidegger, 1993: p. 106). This very schematic mention of ‘metontology’ could nonetheless be a 
remark added later to the manuscript.  
xii. Concerning metontology, see, among others, Greisch, 1994: pp. 481-3; Grondin, 2003: pp. 46-7; Kisiel, 
2001: pp. 263-4. 
xiii. Among numerous mentions of the non-religious character of Aristotle’s concept of the divine (theion), 
we can include: Heidegger, 2005: pp. 99-101, 389; 1993: p. 179; 1992: pp. 222, 242/153, 167.  
xiv. This translation of Freiheit zum Grunde is taken from Michael Heim’s translation of The Metaphysical 
Foundations of Logic, which we prefer to “freedom unto the ground” (William McNeill, Pathmarks). 
xv. This objectification of being was not yet considered a danger for philosophy at the end of the 1920s, as it 
was to be in the Beiträge and the upcoming texts (Heidegger, 1989: p. 451/317). Let us simply recall that 
the lecture course from the summer of 1927, Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, still refered to it as 
the basic task for philosophy, as ‘the basic act of the constitution of ontology, of philosophy’ (Heidegger, 
1975: p. 459/322). 
xvi. In his 1988 book Martin Heidegger. Phänomenologie der Freiheit, Günther Figal described the whole 
path of Heidegger’s thought as a ‘philosophy of freedom,’ arguing that the analysis of Dasein is a way of 
understanding what it means for Dasein to be free (see also Ruin, 2008: 280). We can easily highlight the 
importance of freedom in Sein und Zeit by mentioning concepts such as ‘Freedom toward death’ (Freiheit 
zum Tode), ‘Dasein’s being free for its ownmost possibility’ or ‘Potentiality-of-Being’ (Seinkönnen). 
Nevertheless, the concept of freedom as such was not yet the fundamental concept in regard to the question 
of Dasein’s being. 
xvii. On the difference between Kant’s and Schelling’s concepts of freedom according to Heidegger, see 
Ruin, 2008: pp. 287-8. 
xviii. In the summer semester 1928, Heidegger described the method of retrieval in these words: 
‘Fundamental ontology is always only a retrieval (Wiederholung) of what is ancient, of what happened 
earlier. But what is ancient gets transmitted to us by retrieval, only if we grant it the possibility of 
transformation. For by their nature these problems demand as much. All this has its basis, as we will show 
in detail, in the historicity of the understanding of being. And characteristically, the tradition (Tradition), 
i.e., the externalized transmission (Weitergabe), deprives the problem of this very transformation in a 
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retrieval. Tradition passes down definite propositions and opinions, fixed ways of questioning and 
discussing things. This external tradition of opinions and anonymous viewpoints is currently called ‘the 
history of problems’ (Problemgeschichte). The external tradition, and its employment in the history of 
philosophy, denies problems their life, and that means it seeks to stifle their transformation, and so we 
must fight against it.’ (Heidegger, 1978: p. 197/155; slightly modified translation) 
xix. This relation between Destruktion and freedom is still stressed in the 1955 text Was ist das—die 
Philosophie?: ‘Destruction means: to open our ear, to make ourselves free (freimachen) for what speaks to 
us in tradition as the being of beings.’ (Heidegger, 1966: p. 22/73) 
xx. See Heidegger, 1971: p. 79. On this, see the fifth section of my “L’onto-théologie dans l’oeuvre de 
Martin Heidegger. Récit d’une confrontation avec la pensée occidentale” (2006b). 
xxi. Nancy writes: ‘Actually, an entire epoch was invented through repetition, and invented its difference as 
repetition, that is, difference as a secondary consequence of the ‘end of philosophy,’ as the re-demand 
(repetitio) for what is at stake in philosophy. But it is Heidegger himself who inaugurated thinking as 
repetition (and not as critique or sublation) of what had already been thought.’ (Nancy, 1988: p. 76/190)  
